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ESSAYS
Original Intent, the View of the
Framers, and the Role of the
Ratifiers
Ronald D. Rotunda*
For much of its history, the Supreme Court has purported to en-
gage in what is called "interpretive" judicial review. Interpretive review
occurs when the Court
ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by reference to one of the
value judgments of which the Constitution consists-that is, by reference to a value
judgment embodied, though not necessarily explicitly, either in some particular
provision of the text of the Constitution or in the overall structure of government
ordained by the Constitution.'
Justice William Brennan, for example, engaged in interpretive review
when he argued in his recent Holmes Lecture that the framers intended
the eighth amendment eventually to bar capital punishment.2 The legit-
imacy of interpretive review-as one leading advocate of noninterpre-
tive review has acknowledged-is not particularly difficult to justify.s
However, in recent years more and more commentators have urged
the courts to adopt frankly noninterpretive values in deciding constitu-
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois, College of Law; co-author, R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK &
J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE (1986); J. NOWAK, R. Ro-
TUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1983). I wish to thank Professor Gerard Bradley
for reading this manuscript and offering suggestions.
1. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LE-
GITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 10 (1982) (footnote omitted); see also
Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 LAW. & HIST. REV. 267, 269 (1986).
2. See Brennan, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the
Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 324-25 (1986).
3. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 10-11. In fact: "No contemporary constitutional theorist seri-
ously disputes the legitimacy of interpretive review." Id. at 11.
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tional cases. The justification for noninterpretive review is more troub-
lesome. Proponents of noninterpretive review appear to admit
cheerfully that judges should adopt values not found in, influenced by,
or derived from, the constitutional text or the logic of precedent. Some
have argued that the modern judiciary should act simply because it is
"the voice and conscience of contemporary society."4 Judges should rec-
ognize correct moral and political values, and find the "right answers"
in order to go "beyond the value judgments established by the framers
of the written Constitution (extraconstitutional policymaking)."5
Noninterpretivists see the Constitution not so much as a blueprint for
allocating and limiting government power but as a way for judges to
forge an ideal society-or, at least, a society that they view as ideal.
These commentators advocate "a more candidly creative role" for the
Court because "the highest mission of the Supreme Court. . . is not to
conserve judicial credibility, but in the Constitution's own phrase, 'to
form a more perfect Union.""
In the continuing debate between interpretivists and noninterpre-
tivists, the noninterpretivists recently have argued that the framers did
not intend the judiciary to be bound or illuminated by the intent of the
framers or ratifiers of the Constitution. One commentator, for example,
is quoted as claiming that James Madison "never" intended that origi-
nal intention should be the oracular guide in explaining the Constitu-
tion.7 Another remarked bluntly: "[T]he framers, after all, are dead,
and in the contemporary world, their views are neither relevant nor
morally binding."8
The framers and ratifiers of the Constitution are dead, but their
views are hardly irrelevant. That is not to argue that the courts should
interpret the Constitution as rigidly as one might interpret a municipal
ordinance. No one seriously advances that argument today. Yet there is
a middle ground between rejecting any role for history and unthinking
reliance on history. Uncovering original intent may be helpful and use-
ful even if a strict view of history may not be controlling when it is read
in context. Not all judges and commentators who look at history-as
well as the other tools of judicial review such as text, structure, logic,
and precedent-Will reach the same conclusions on every issue, but they
4. The quoted remarks are from a United States district court brief referred to by Justice
(now Chief Justice) William Rehnquist in his article, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx.
L. REV. 693, 695 (1976); cf. G. CALABRESI, JUDICIAL SUNSET:. A COMMON LAW FOR OUR AGE OF STAT-
UTES (1982).
5. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at ix, x (emphasis in original); see also id. at 101-14.
6. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW iv (1978).
7. Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1986, at 77, 79 (empha-
sis in original) (referring to remarks of a law professor).
8. C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 103 (1978) (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 41:507508
ORIGINAL INTENT
at least will start at the same base line, and that base line helps confer
legitimacy on judicial review and cautions the courts in its exercise.
The issues relating to original intent and the uses of history have
created almost a cottage industry in the scholarly literature. In this Es-
say I cannot canvas all of the arguments, but I hope to set them in
proper perspective and to contribute to the more recent debate by fo-
cusing on a single question: Whether the framers actually intended that
subsequent generations not be bound by the original intent. This Essay
begins by looking at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the dis-
tinction the framers drew between."private" intent and "public" intent.
Soon after the delegates to the Constitutional Convention began
their deliberations in that hot summer in Philadelphia in 1787, they
elected George Washington as the presiding officer,9 decided some im-
portant procedural questions, ° and then turned to the question of se-
crecy. That issue was high on their agenda. They quickly agreed to
conduct all deliberations in secret." So that the delegates could speak
in complete candor and not be encouraged to play to the press, they
also decided that yeas and nays would not be called by delegate name.12
Votes would be recorded only by states. To make news leaks more diffi-
cult, the delegates decided that, while a member could inspect the jour-
nal of the proceedings, no one would be permitted to make a copy of
any of its entries. In addition, the delegates ordered that "nothing spo-
ken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or communicated
without leave."'I s The Convention even ordered that sentries be placed
both within and outside of the meeting place in order to prevent any
unauthorized person from approaching. A contemporary observer said
that these sentries "appear to be very alert in the performance of their
duty.
'14
An anecdote involving George Washington illustrates the impor-
tance the delegates attached to the secrecy of their private delibera-
tions. Washington, we must remember, was at the zenith of his
popularity. Professor Max Farrand tells us that the "feeling towards
him was one of devotion, almost awe and reverence. His presence in the
9. 1 J. ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 120-21 (1845, re-
published in 1937 & 1968).
10. The delegates decided that each state would have one vote; seven states should constitute
a quorum; and only a simple majority was needed to pass on all issues. Id. at 141; 5 J. ELLIOTT,
supra note 9, at 124.
11. 1 J. ELLIOTT, supra note 9, at 42-43.
12. Id. at 123. Madison's unofficial notes sometimes record the names of individuals for or
against certain questions.





convention was felt to be essential to the success of its work."' 15 During
the course of the Convention one of the delegates accidentally dropped
a copy of some proposals. Another delegate, discovering the lost papers,
brought them to Washington. Like an old school marm, Washington
scolded the unknown delegate for losing the papers: "I must entreat
Gentlemen to be more careful, lest our transactions get into the news
papers, and disturb the public repose by premature speculations.' 6
Washington-held in awe by the delegates and already the de facto
leader of the country-threw the papers on the table, demanded that
the owner pick them up, and then left the room. The delegates reacted
like scared school children: no one came forward. No one was willing to
accept the responsibility for this possible breach of secrecy.
Because of the belief in the need for secrecy, it was not until many
years after the Constitution had been ratified that Congress ordered
that those proceedings and fragmentary minutes which were in the
hands of the Government should be printed.' 7 The people who publicly
debated and ratified the new Constitution-the generation of
1787-had no access to the Convention notes. In fact, when President
Washington, in his message to Congress of March 30, 1796, referred to
the unpublished Journal of the Constitutional Convention in support
of a particular interpretation of the Constitution, various members of
Congress thought that his reference had violated the Convention's rule
of secrecy."8 Much of what we now know comes from one person,
Madison, who took it upon himself to compile a more complete and
unofficial record. Madison's notes, however, were not published until
1840.19
Nowadays we often comb with fine care the various notes taken
during that Convention as if they were a magic key to unlock the Con-
stitution's secrets. We must realize, however, that the people who rati-
fied the Constitution following that Convention in the summer of 1787
15. Id. at 15.
16. Quoted in C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 139 (1928).
17. The Resolve of Congress of March 27, 1818 ordered printed those papers in the posses-
sion of John Quincy Adams that related to the Constitutional Convention. These papers included
the minutes of the Journal of the Convention. C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 797. The year 1821
saw the publication of the notes of Robert Yates, a member of the Convention. Yates, however, left
the Convention on July 10, 1787, over two months before the Convention adjourned. Id. at 798.
Madison's notes were not published until 1840. Warren notes: "It is a singular fact that it was not
until fifty-three years after the Constitution was signed that the American people were afforded
any adequate knowledge of the debates of the Federal Convention." Id. at 802.
18. See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 775-76 (1796) (remarks of Rep. James Madison); id. at 734 (re-
marks of Rep. Albert Gallatin). Madison also wrote Jefferson that Washington's use of the Con-
vention's Journal violated the Convention's rule of secrecy. Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Apr. 4, 1796), quoted in C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 796.
19. C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 802.
510 [Vol. 41:507
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did not have access to any of these notes or minutes. Many of these
writings-which did not see the light of day until over a half century
after the Convention was held-could not have influenced the ratifiers
because they were hidden from them. That is not to say that the Con-
vention notes are necessarily irrelevant as an aid in interpreting the
written document. The secret Convention notes may help tell us what
certain words may mean, how much language may be stretched or re-
stricted.20 But they cannot control what the words must mean. The ra-
tifiers of the new Constitution should not be held to have approved of
the hidden Convention notes any more than your incorporation of my
language necessarily incorporates my hidden intent.21 As a logical mat-
ter, you cannot be held to adopt someone else's hidden, secret
thoughts.12 As Representative Albert Gallatin noted during the congres-
sional debates on the Jay Treaty, it is wrong to rely on "the opinions
and constructions of those persons who had framed and proposed the
Constitution, opinions given in private, constructions unknown to the
people when they adopted the instrument.
'23
Some commentators go well beyond this logical point and appear to
argue that the framers-as an historical matter-did not intend the
Court to look at public intent, reflected in public sources such as The
Federalist Papers, the historical circumstances, and the state ratifying
conventions. 4 I do not believe that the historical evidence supports this
conclusion. While Madison, for example, opposed looking at secret, sub-
jective, "private" intent, expressed in the halls of the Philadelphia Con-
vention, he also urged us to look "for the meaning of that instrument
beyond the face of the instrument. . not in the General Convention
which proposed, but in the State Conventions which accepted and rati-
fied it."
'25
20. Thus Luther Martin, one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, presented his
eyewitness account of the Convention's view of powers delegated to the United States. See McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 373-76 (1819).
21. Cf. United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
22. Professor Powell's elaborate historical research supports this conclusion. See Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HAav. L. REV. 885 (1985).
23. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 734 (1796) (emphasis added).
24. See supra text accompanying note 7. Parts of Professor Powell's study appear to present
this argument. He notes that various congressmen opposed looking at "extraneous sources" such as
the state ratifying conventions. Powell, supra note 22, at 919. He also argued that in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), it was proper for the Court to ignore "the virtually unanimous
... response" of the federalists as expressed in Federalist No. 81 and instead to just look at the
text and interpret it without reference to such historical background. Powell, supra note 22, at
922-23. Chisholm, one should recall, was soon overturned by the enactment of the eleventh amend-
ment. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1889).
25. Quoted in C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 794; see also Letter from James Madison to S.H.
Smith (Feb. 2, 1827); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821); Letter from
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When we talk popularly about the framers' intent, we really should
be more precise and refer to the ratifiers' intent, what Alexander Ham-
ilton in The Federalist Papers called "the intention of the people.""6
The early case law and constitutional authorities recognized that pub-
licly available authorities, such as The Federalist Papers, offered a con-
temporary and very relevant explication of the meaning of the new
Constitution.17 In fact, turning to The Federalist Papers was one of
Justice Story's "Rules of Interpretation.
'2
History, of course, must be read in context. Sometimes it may tell
us that a particular clause was calculated to be ambiguous, perhaps to
paper over differences, to provide for flexibility, or to allow for evolu-
tionary growth in the law.29 At other times the history will not speak
with a clear voice, and reasonable people will interpret the evidence dif-
ferently. But these obvious facts certainly do not mean that the intent
of the ratifiers is irrelevant, or that the framers and ratifiers intended
for us to ignore that intent when we can discover it. Pharaoh's dreams
were not easy to interpret, but Joseph did not therefore advise Pharaoh
to ignore them.
A belief in the relevance of history does not entail any doctrinaire,
unsophisticated, mechanical application of the views of the past."0 The
James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), all cited in C. WARREN, supra note 16, at 801 & n.1.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), reprinted in R. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 10 (2d ed. 1985).
27. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 372 (Luther Martin's
argument to the Court included reading extracts from The Federalist Papers and the Virginia and
New York Conventions). See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 23.35 (1986).
28. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTON OF THE U.S. 134, 148 (1833, reprinted
with an Introduction by R. Rotunda & J. Nowak 1987).
29. The authors of The Federalist Papers "sometimes exaggerated [the Constitution's] ad-
vantages, and spread over the objectionable features the gloss of plausible construction." State v.
McBride, 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 400, 410 (1839). See generally G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATION-
SHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 17-72 (1986).
30. Nor does considering the relevance of original intent require rejection of all modern
precedents, as some have feared. Attorney General Edwin Meese, for example, strongly espouses
the relevance of original intent and also embraces the modern view of the commerce clause and
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Meese, Speech of Nov. 15, 1985, Before the
D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division November 15, 1985, Washington, D.C.,
reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE. INTERPRETING OUR WRITrEN CONSTrrUTION 31 (The Federalist
Society 1986). The Attorney General stated:
When the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, [347 U.S. 483 (1954),] sounded
the death knell of official segregation in the country, it earned all the plaudits it received. But
the Supreme Court in that case was not giving new life to old words, or adapting a "living,"
"flexible" Constitution to new reality. It was restoring the original principle of the Constitu-
tion to constitutional law. The Brown Court was correcting the damage done 50 years earlier,
when in Plessy v. Ferguson, [163 U.S. 537 (1896),] an earlier Supreme Court had disregarded
[Vol. 41:507
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framers and ratifiers of the Constitution intended a flexible document,
a document that would endure for ages. In fact, both private and public
intent demonstrate this point.
Thomas Jefferson furnishes us with evidence of public intent. He
proposed that the new Constitution should expire automatically by
1823 at the latest because each new generation, he thought, should have
to come to terms with its own Constitution. Jefferson selected that
number because thirty-four years was the average remaining life expec-
tancy of people who had reached the age of majority (twenty-one years)
in 1789, the year the new Government began. The generation of 1787
rejected this sunset proposal."' The Constitution should have a longer
life than that. As John Marshall later concluded: "[W]e must never for-
get ... that it is a constitution we are expounding."32 Our Constitution
should not be interpreted with the strictness of a municipal code, be-
cause that would be contrary to the original intent.
The private debates also support this conclusion. Madison and
Roger Sherman at one point proposed a particular change to allow more
flexibility and to take into account future growth in the new country.
One delegate objected: "It is not to be supposed that the government
will last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this
vast country, including the western territory, will, one hundred and fifty
years hence, remain one nation?"3 3 The delegates apparently thought
so; they opted for Madison's change.3 4
Some who attack any use of original intent argue that a modern
day judge should not be required to apply a constitutional provision
the clear intent of the Framers of the civil war amendments to eliminate the legal degradation
of blacks, and had contrived a theory of the Constitution to support the charade of "separate
but equal" discrimination.
Similarly, the decisions of the New Deal and beyond that freed Congress to regulate com-
merce and enact a plethora of social legislation were not judicial adaptations of the Constitu-
tion to new realities. They were in fact removals of encrustations of earlier courts that had
strayed from the original intent of the Framers regarding the power of the legislature to make
policy.
Id. at 37-38. Some commentators argue that Brown was not true to historical intent because many
members of the Congress that proposed the fourteenth amendment also supported school segrega-
tion. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 2, 68. However, we must look at the intent of the public, the
ratifiers, not merely the opinion of certain members of Congress. While the intent of the ratifiers
and framers may not be entirely clear, it is true that after the Civil War, many people did intend
to eliminate all vestiges of slavery. The fact that Congress enacted the broad protection of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 is proof of that. The Supreme Court invalidated this law in The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
31. Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes of Change, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REv. 933, 937.
32. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis in original). Marshall, by the way, be-
lieved that this conclusion was what the framers had "entertained." Id.




only to the precise situations envisioned two hundred years ago. That
argument is a strawman. History must be read in context. We cannot
pretend to discern how the framers or ratifiers would vote on a specific
case today, a world very different from the one they knew. 5 Looking at
the Constitution's text, history, structure, and precedents6 helps supply
the judge with a "core value," a major premise; the judge then supplies
the minor premise in the circumstances of a particular case "in order to
protect the constitutional freedom in circumstances the framers could
not foresee.
'3 7
Similarly, when the Constitution grants powers to Congress, it
often speaks in broad outlines in order to provide for the future. The
framers, said Marshall, understood this point. That is why they drafted
the flexible "necessary and proper" clause, a "provision, made in a con-
stitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. . . . [and to] exigencies
which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can best
be provided for as they occur."3 8 They certainly did not believe that the
Constitution should be a "dead" document but a "living" one.
Obviously, not all judges using tools such as text, history, structure,
logic, and precedent will agree on every issue. We expect reasonable
people to have reasonable disagreements. That is why human judges,
rather than computers, interpret the law. This approach, while it yields
no easy answers, helps confer legitimacy on judicial review, and is still
poles apart from the view of those who argue that the Court in constitu-
tional cases should derive and exercise broad discretionary authority
simply because it is "the voice and conscience of contemporary soci-
ety."39 Those who propose a dramatic "fusion of constitutional law and
35. Bork, in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 30,
at 46 (speech before the University of San Diego Law School, Nov. 18, 1985); see also, Levinson,
On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of the Ten Commandments, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 719 (1985).
36. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. L.J. 383, 394 (1985); see also Rotunda,
The Constitutional Future of the Bill of Rights: A Closer Look at Commercial Speech and State
Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools, 65 N.C.L. REv. 917, 920-21 (1987).
37. Bork, supra note 35, at 46. See also Maryland v. McCulloch, in which Chief Justice Mar-
shall made a similar point; he argued that a "constitution," by its very nature, only marks "its
great outlines .... its important objects [are] designated, and the minor ingredients which com-
pose those objects [are to] be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 407.
38. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415 (emphasis omitted). This point is discussed more
thoroughly in W. BERNS, TAkING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 207-09 (1987).
39. Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 695; see, e.g., Parker, The Past of Constitutional The-
ory-And Its Future, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223, 258 & n.146 (1981) (stating that "we need to deepen
our critique of orthodox theory ... to ensure that we ... do not ... slip back into the easy argot
of the past .... My approach is to take seriously and work from (while, no doubt revising) the
classical conception of a republic, including its elements of relative equality, mobilization of the
citizenry, and civic virtue").
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moral theory" even express surprise that "incredibly," that fusion "has
yet to take place. '40 Why have a written constitution if the writing does
not limit the judges?41 The Constitution contains no provision that
makes the courts a roving commission to find and correct perceived un-
fairness as measured by the latest political theory.
Others opposed to any use of original intent concede this point, but
argue that there is no reason why we should be bound by the intentions
of men who died nearly two centuries ago. Moreover, the argument con-
tinues, the fact that the franchise was so restricted two centuries
ago-typically to adult, white, male, freeholders-furnishes an addi-
tional reason why today we should not feel bound by original intent.42
I frankly do not understand that argument. We certainly feel
bound by the original intention when the framers and ratifiers have
spoken with crystal clarity-for example, that two persons must witness
the same overt act of treason,43 or that the presidential term is limited
to four years.4 In some cases we may be unable to decipher the original
intention-and apply it in light of modern conditions-but that is
hardly an argument to reject the relevance of historical intent as an aid
to interpretation when we do have evidence of what that intent is. His-
tory may be helpful, even when it is not controlling. "We do not confine
the judges, we caution them.
'45
40. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1977) (proposing "a fusion of constitutional
law and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly, has yet to take place").
41. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). "The powers
of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten,
the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limi-
tation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be
restrained?" Id. As Justice Brennan stated in a 1985 speech: "Justices are not Platonic guardians
appointed to wield authority according to their personal moral predilections." N.Y. Times, Oct. 13,
1985, at 36, col. 2.
42. See supra text accompanying note 8. Professor Larry Simon calculates that only about
2.5% of the population voted in favor of the ratification of the Constitution. Simon, The Authority
of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REv.
1482, 1498 n.44 (1985). Professor Simon notes:
The Constitution was adopted by propertied, white males who had no strong incentives to
attend to the concerns and interests of the impoverished, the nonwhites, or nonmales who
were alive then, much less those of us alive today who hold conceptions of our interests and
selves very different from the ones held by those in the original clique. These are hardly small
or overly theoretical problems for a theory that proposes to bind us to the clique's intent for
reasons that, if coherent, must ultimately be rooted in our own autonomy and welfare. They
are thus fatal criticisms for any contract-based claim for originalism as the exclusive method
of constitutional interpretation.
Id. at 1499-1500 (footnote omitted).
43. U.S. CONsT. art. III,§ 3, cl. 1.
44. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
45. A. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1970).
The actual words used in the Constitution can be very illuminating. For example, § 1 of the
fourteenth amendment refers to "persons." In fact, it says: "[a] 1 persons." U.S. CONsT. amend.
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History does not support the position of those noninterpretivists
who claim that the framers and ratifiers did not intend the judiciary to
look at original intent. Looking at original intent both helps legitimate
judicial review and cautions the judges in its exercise. In The Federalist
Papers Hamilton explained that if there is a conflict between a statute
passed by Congress and the written Constitution, then "the Constitu-
tion ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to
the intention of their agents."'4 The Constitution "is, in fact, and must
be regarded by the judges as a fundamental law."' 47 Yet he also cau-
tioned the judges to exercise "judgment" and not uncabined "will.
'48
Judges have been trying to do that for most of our last two hundred
years; their legacy has been a Constitution that has brought us stability
without dictatorship, freedom without license.
XIV, § 1. "Persons" have to include women as well as men. Indeed, § 2 of the fourteenth amend-
ment specifically refers to "male inhabitants." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The framers knew
how to say "male" when they meant "male." In § 1, they did not say "male." They said "all
persons." Thus, § 1 must include all persons. To argue the contrary is to ignore the text.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), supra note 26.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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